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A recent parliamentary committee meeting devoted to “Freedom of Expression
and the Internet”, began with a short demonstration in which Internet sites
describing the Order of Battle of the Israeli Airforce, Nuclear weapons1, s ell
as some pornography were reviewed. Members of the Israeli Knesset
(parliament) were shocked and astounded -- not by the pornography, but rather
by the fact that “classified” information was readily available on the Internet.
The discussion quickly turned from dealing with freedom of expression, to how
to prevent information of this kind from being readily available on the Internet.
This incident serves to underscore the inherent conflict of values in Israeli
society -- the primacy of national security, which subordinates almost every
other aspect of democracy in Israel, versus the ideal of liberal democracy
focusing on individual rights -- chief among these being freedom of expression.
These conflicting values have been brought to the surface in recent years due to
the incredible growth of Internet use by the general public in Israel.
Yitzhak Rabin, the late Prime Minister of Israel and a former military leader,
once described Israel’s security situation as one of “dormant war” erupting
every few years into active conflict.2 Others have described Israel as a garrison
state, surrounded by enemies. In order to understand the relationship between
national security and democracy in Israel, one must view the social, political
and cultural context. In the founding Zionist ethos of Israel, the tension between
national security and democracy hardly existed as an issue.3 When matters of
                                                 
1The sites reviewed were: http://www.geocities.com/TheTropics/9305/ (The Air Force) and
http://www.envirolink.org/issues/nuketesting/hew/Israel/index.html;
http://www.janes.com/geopol/sentinel/geosent_focus10.html (Nuclear Weapons). These sites are
based solely on information garnered from open sources generally available to the public.
2See Y. Rabin’s lecture in Academy in Memory of Yitzchak Sadeh, Sept. 21, 1967 (Hebrew).
Quoted in Horowitz and Lissak Trouble in Utopia, p. 195.
3Cohen, A.: 1993, Nuclear Weapons and Israeli Democracy, in A. Y niv (ed.) National Security
and Democracy in Israel, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, p. 203
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national security are at stake, democratic considerations are seen as a luxury.
The security of the state is strongly tied to the state’s survival, and as such, the
cause of security must override all other causes, including democracy, but more
specifically, freedom of expression. This attitude towards national security in
Israel has been adopted and internalized not only by the government and
government institutions and agencies, but since Israel’s founding in 1948, by
the public as well.
Partial roots of the attitudes towards the primacy of national security may be
found in the policy of mamlachtiut or statism, as developed by David Ben
Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister. Briefly stated, the official policy of statism
developed by Ben Gurion was composed of three elements: The necessity for
the state framework to provide universal services; the exclusiveness of state
activity in certain areas of public life; and the depolitization of state structures
to render them impartial to political party considerations. This s atism was
crucial in forming the framework for a common political culture among new
immigrant from varying backgrounds. A crucial component of Ben Gurion’s
statism was the Israeli Army (IDF), whose role, beyond that of defense, was to
fulfill the function of a melting pot in society, serving as a crucible in shaping
the national identity of Israel’s Jewish citizens. Thus, all men and women, from
the age of 18 are expected to serve three and two years respectively, with an
additional month of reserve duty for men, every year until the age of 55. The
mandatory service in the IDF, and the subsequent reserve duty tend to
strengthen respect for issues of national security in Israel.
A number of incidents have taken place over the past few years which has
served to test the feasibility of protecting national security from the eyes of the
public as well as Israel’s potential enemies. The turning point was the Gulf War.
While the Pentagon enforced severe restrictions on the press in the theater of
operation, the foreign press in Israel used satellite and facsimiles to broadcast
reports. The height of this was when missiles were falling on Tel Aviv, and the
reporter for CNN was broadcasting the exact point of impact. The Iraqis could
not have hoped for better information regarding their ability to launch missiles
at civilian targets. In a conversation with a reservist who served in the military
censor’s office during the war, the military censor admitted to being powerless
in the face of communication technologies such as satellite and facsimile
broadcast, and could only hope to do his best at keeping up appearances. At the
same time, beyond the public eye, the IRC channels and Usenet groups on the
Internet were providing an additional source of information to the public within
Israel and beyond, much in the way of Ham Radio operators did in the US in the
‘40 and ‘50s. Computer users seized  technology and made it work, providing
accurate, uncensored  reports of the effects of the Gulf War (see Frederick,
1992).
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The second incident concerned a posting to various Usenet news groups
dealing with Israel, providing the name and address of the newly appointed
head of the General Security Services (GSS). Until then, the names of the heads
of Israel’s intelligence organizations were known to a relatively few people, and
were considered state secrets. On March 14, 1995, the following post appeared
on a number of news groups on Usenet:
Message-ID: <123311Z14031995@anon.penet.fi>
Path:
NetVision.net.il!aristo.tau.ac.il!barilvm!dearn!nntp.gmd.de!stern.fok
us.gmd.
de!ceres.fokus.gmd.de!
zib-berlin.de!Germany.EU.net!EU.net!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi
Newsgroups: soc.culture.israel,talk.politics.mideast
From: an217892@anon.penet.fi
X-Anonymously-To: soc.culture.israel,talk.politics.mideast
Organization: Anonymous contact service
Reply-To: an217892@anon.penet.fi
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 1995 12:27:34 UTC
Subject:      Shabak4
Lines: 12
Mazel tov to the new head of Shabak Carmi Gilon.  You can send
letters of congratulations to:
Carmi Gilon
6 Hagefen Street
Mevaseret Zion
Jerusalem
This Usenet posting managed to make headlines in all the daily papers in
Israel, but following orders of the military censor, the name and address was
blacked out. At the same time, anybody with Internet access could view the
posting. A number of months later, the name of C r iGilon was officially
made public, as was the name of the head of the Mossad. Since this incident,
every intended appointment to the heads of both security services are now made
public, allowing public debate and criticism prior to the appointments.
The third incident occurred a few months ago, following the attempted
assassination of Khaled Mishal by the Mossad in Jordan. While the story was
breaking elsewhere, the prime minister requested that the press refrain from
reporting on the matter, claiming that such reports would endanger the lives of
Mossad agents still in Jordan.  The press went along with the voluntary
censorship until details of the botched operation appeared on the Sunday Times
of London web site. The dailies then felt free to deal with details of the case,
leading to a public debate which almost caused the resignation of the prime
minister, and which eventually led to the appointment of a new head of the
Mossad.
                                                 
4SHABAK is the Hebrew Acronym for the GSS.
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These incidents serve to underscore the tensions between national security
and democracy in Israel, a tension that today is related more to the political and
cultural concepts of democracy than to any real threat to the country’s
existence. Israel as a society is struggling with traditionalism, authoritarianism
and nationalism, each appearing as components within the country’s unique
political culture. This paper will deal with the political and cultural aspects of
democracy and national security in Israel vis  vis computer mediated
communication, focusing on where these issues conflict with prevailing cultural
attitudes towards freedom of expression and freedom of information. Prospects
for cultural and political change as a result of widespread Internet use in Israel
will also be discussed.
